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INTRODUCTION
ONE AMONG THE MANNE:
CHANGING OUR COURSE
Ronald A. Casst
We all want to make a difference. We want our lives to count
for something, to change the world if only in a modest way. Of
course, the older we get the more modest a change we are willing to
accept as victory. As often observed, maturity consists in large part
of the willingness to settle for ever-shrinking successes. Winning a
case, being cited by the Supreme Court, perhaps by any court, having
a book reviewed in the New York Review of Books-these are suffi-
cient inidicia of success for most lawyers and law scholars.
Not so for Henry Manne. He has made more of a difference at
more margins than virtually any other professor of his generation.
I will not substantiate that declaration with comparisons. In-
stead, I will summarize some of the accomplishments of Henry's ex-
traordinary-and yet on-going--career.
This will be done from high altitude, not only because I am on an
airplane while writing this, but also because it looks at the broad land-
scape of Henry's accomplishments rather than at the details. As an
academic administrator, I seldom am allowed prolonged contact with
important matters so knowledge of details is a mere memory, and
memory long since has begun to slip. That is a poor excuse for
painting with so broad a brush (to switch metaphors) as I will here.
Manne's considerable accomplishments, however, cannot readily be
compassed, and a view of details will not capture how he has changed
the course of legal scholarship and teaching, of judicial decision-
making, of the law, and of so many lives. I seek here merely to im-
part the flavor of those changes.
In recounting what Henry Manne has done, I must speak of sev-
eral Henry Mannes. There is Henry Manne the Scholar, Henry
Manne the Entrepreneur, Henry Manne the Dean, and Henry Manne
the Friend. All are important men. And all are one.
t Dean and Melville Madison Bigelow Professor of Law, Boston University School of
Law.
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HENRY I: MANNE THE SCHOLAR
Long ago in a land not too far away, Henry Manne discovered
that basic economic analysis-standard microeconomic analysis, both
as positive and as normative construct-could generate powerful in-
sights for addressing legal problems.1 Manne was not the first to
make that discovery. Others had done so before. Some published
articles or books using economic analysis, well or not so well. Some
taught but were not published, Aaron Director most notably.2
Manne was one of the first legal scholars, however, to use eco-
nomics to generate a new insight into a legal issue and to do so in a
way that dramatically changed discourse about that issue. As a young
professor at George Washington University, Henry wrote path-
breaking articles in the Harvard Business Review and the George
Washington Law Review, alonj with his better-known book, Insider
Trading and the Stock Market. He argued that insider trading was
not a practice by which corporate managers took advantage of their
positions to the detriment of both their own stockholders and other
traders. Instead, Manne said, insider trading was an efficient mecha-
nism for compensating managers and for aligning stock markets with
the best information about corporate prospects.
The book and articles contradicted virtually everything that was
then being taught about corporations, manager-shareholder relation-
ships, and the operation of securities markets. They laid the ground-
work for a renaissance in corporate law and securities law scholar-
ship, one that continues to this day. These writings' novelty and pre-
science explains their place on the list of most-cited law pieces.
4
Moreover, Manne's early writings explicitly or implicitly em-
body a startling number of the themes that have animated the past
thirty-five years of law and economics scholarship. Manne built on a
rational expectations model. He saw stockholders and managers as
parties to a principal-agent compact that runs in both directions, as
later works by Fama and by Jensen and Meckling would explain fur-
It may be misleading to associate Henry with standard microeconomic analysis, as his
tendency has been toward the Austrian, process-oriented school of economic analysis rather
than the more static analysis that has been dominant in the United States. For present purposes,
however, this is a mere quibble.
2 The most famous publication of Professor Director's thinking, describing "Director's
Law," was written by George Stigler. See George J. Stigler, Director's Law of Public Income
Redistribution, 13 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1970).
3 Henry G. Manne, In Defense ofInsider Trading, HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1966, at
113; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Administrative Process, 35 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
473 (1967); HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
'4 A quick search of Westlaw's law review database indicates that the book alone has
been cited 233 times; see also William L Carney, The Legacy of "The Market for Corporate
Control" and the Origins of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215, 238-39, 243 (1999) (pro-
viding statistical compilations of citation to Manne's articles).
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ther.5 Manne understood that information is costly to obtain and that
each person has a point at which the cost of searching for additional
information is greater than the expected benefit. He saw as well that
traders in a market should not be expected to possess identical values
or identical information-whether the market is a securities market or
any other market-and that traders understood this point and adjusted
their behavior to it. Manne accepted that price typically was an effi-
cient mechanism to encapsulate information. And he knew that the
best way to get information into the public domain quickly was to
provide an incentive for those most likely to have it to act on it. All
of these points have become the foundations on which substantial lit-
eratures have been built. And all were within Henry's grasp long be-
fore they were accepted orthodoxy even in the law and economics
camp.
Manne marked out a path for scholarship that for more than a
third of a century has given other scholars rich veins of ore to mine.
He was viewed with suspicion and even hostility by those who saw
his arguments as threats, a view that was most intense among those
whose beliefs and scholarship ran in another direction and whose own
intellectual capital did not allow them to engage Manne successfully.
His embrace of economics suggested that those who would argue
with him needed more than the rough analogical reasoning that char-
acterized most legal analysis.
Manne did not, however, embrace a technical, mathematical
economic analysis. He did not reach for points that could only be
grasped after slogging through a minefield of equations. He did not
want to elucidate possibilities that could become a basis for policy
choices only in the unlikely event that certain data came into the do-
main of policy-makers in a reliable form. Manne sought a useful eco-
nomic analysis, not a perfect or highly sophisticated economic analy-
sis. Unlike the broader themes of Henry's writing, that preference has
not generally pointed the way for later law and economics scholars,
though the deficiency here is the academy's, not Manne's.
One final point about Henry Marine the Scholar. Until quite re-
cently the typical tenured full professor of law was someone who
viewed scholarship as something to be done only on rare occasions.
A survey reviewing law review publication by tenured full professors
over the period 1976-1981 discovered that zero and one were the
5 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL.
ECON. 288 (1980) (arguing that the separation of security ownership and control is an efficient
form of economic organization when viewing a large corporation as a set of contracts among
factors of production); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and
Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305
(1976) (defining the concept of agency costs and showing its relationship to the separation of
ownership and control of large corporations).
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dominant numbers of articles published over the entire period.6 Few
professors continued an active life of scholarship after age 40. Manne
again is different. He has continued to write and to think, to ask hard
questions and to use insights from economics to answer them. Thus
Manne will continue to contribute new things to us, even while his
earliest works continue to teach.
HENRY II: MANNE THE ENTREPRENEUR
As remarkable as Henry Manne the Scholar is, it is Henry Manne
the Entrepreneur who has made the largest, the most lasting, and the
most unusual contributions.
Let me start with the unusual part. Law professors are not
known for entrepreneurship. Take the simplest form of entrepreneur-
ship, grantsmanship. Look down any university's list of grants ap-
plied for and grants received. See where the law faculty ranks. It
may not be last, but it will be close.
To be sure, the poor showing reflects the disinclination of those
who supply grant funding to support the work of lawyers and law pro-
fessors. But the lack of grant-getting reflects as well the fact that
most law professors have a lower than normal taste for risk-taking.
Law faculty members receive research stipends from their own
schools. For all practical purposes, law faculty members are paid to
spend three months per year doing the research and writing they want
without having to identify funding sources, write grant applications,
visit prospective donors, or do any of the other work generally needed
to secure support for research or related activity.
Henry Manne is the outstanding example to the contrary. He
created a Law & Economics Center by doggedly pursuing contacts,
tapping resources that had not previously been connected to law
schools or law instruction, and selling his own vision of what legal
reasoning, research and writing, and decision-making should be. The
web of seminars and conferences that Manne spun around himself
must be seen as the product of intense personal effort and ultimately
the reward of personal loyalties; people willing to commit funds to an
enterprise because Manne was at the center of it.
The Law & Economics Center plainly was Manne's baby. Many
individuals contributed to its success at various times; many played
key roles in its intellectual profile or its administration, in gaining
new supporters or broadening its base of personnel, as students,
teachers, or confrPres. But to trace its migration is sufficient to un-
6 See Michael L Swygert & Nathaniel E. Gozansky, Senior Law Faculty Publication
Study: Comparisons of Lav School Productivity, 35 J. LEGAL EDUc. 373, 381 (1985) (showing
that 44.21 percent of senior law faculty members had zero publications and that 20.72 percent
had only one publication).
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derscore the personal character of this venture. Manne started the
Center when he was at the University of Rochester and carried it with
him to the University of Miami. When Manne decamped for Emory,
he regenerated the Center and its programs, which moved with him to
George Mason, where it lives today.
No other institution in the law school world can match what
Manne's Law & Economics Center has done. I will not dwell on
what the Center has done to encourage economists to look more seri-
ously at legal issues. I am as certain that the Center has had an im-
pact as I am ignorant of ways to illustrate this effect. The Center's
more significant accomplishments, in my view, turn on its education
of law professors and judges.
Thirty years ago, you could name the law professors who incor-
porated economic analysis in their teaching or writing in any serious
way without having to use all of your fingers. The Law & Economics
Center was instrumental in changing that. Its program of education in
Economics for Law Professors-known at various times as "Pareto in
the Pines" or "Pareto under the Palms"-has introduced hundreds of
law professors to the way basic economic concepts can help illumi-
nate analysis of legal issues. For some, the insights were novel and
striking--even the concept of negatively sloped demand curves
comes as a shock to many who reason by anecdote, and the implica-
tions of such propositions can be even more amazing. Some who at-
tended Manne's "summer camp" got a good rest or a good tan, but
most came away with more. Most found something in the economic
analysis that changed the way they looked at a problem or a group of
problems. And some found a way of looking at things that funda-
mentally changed their approach to teaching and writing.
The canard about the Center's session for law professors ran
something like this:
A: Freely tradable, transferable property rights.
Q: Doesn't matter.
The joke makes a point. Before their time at Manne's summer camp,
most of the folks who repeat that exchange thought the universal an-
swer was "regulation" or "liability."
Economic language has its drawbacks. At times, simple
thoughts are couched in a peculiar argot and become peculiarly diffi-
cult for folks to comprehend. It's easier for most people to under-
stand "wanting something less when you already have a lot of it" than
it is to understand "declining marginal utility."
Yet often enough framing ideas as economic concepts helps.
Many economic commonplaces clarify our intuitions. A few show
1999]
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that intuition can be wrong-ignoring sunk costs is analytically com-
pelling, except to people who paid $200 for theater tickets to a show
they would not now choose to attend. As Professors Bill Breit and
Ken Elzinga show with their sleuth, Henry Spearman, economic
analysis can help solve real problems.7 And most economic analysis
consists in figuring out the way group behavior changes with changed
incentives or ways to line up costs and benefits to allow comparison,
which is required at some level for every legal issue.
By and large, the summer camps for law professors have had a
significant, positive impact on what is taught in law schools and
written in law journals. I will not undertake to support that by re-
gressing attendance at the camps with production of legal scholar-
ships or by eliminating covariance with economic analysis introduced
from other venues. This is one place where old-fashioned look-and-
see causation analysis should suffice.
An equal or larger contribution has been made by the many con-
ferences sponsored by the Center over the years, often in conjunction
with the Liberty Fund or another foundation. These conferences have
covered an enormous array of topics and have brought together schol-
ars whose interactions often have advanced thinking about a given
matter significantly. Bringing together people who share basic meth-
odological predicates and asking them to address a given matter tends
to reinforce commitment to their shared methodology and to sharpen
the skills used in deploying it. For that reason, the conferences have
played a significant role in bolstering the use of economic approaches
in legal scholarship. The conference arrangement, of course, is not
unique to the Center; it simply has done an uncommonly large num-
ber of them.
By far, however, the bigger impact of the Center almost certainly
has been its impact on the judiciary. The programs for judges have
exposed more than 500 federal judges to economic analysis. Many of
the judges never had occasion before to consider some of the concepts
introduced in the programs for judges. Some who had their first ex-
posure to economic analysis of law in one of Henry's programs for
judges have developed considerable sophistication in economic
analysis.
Deciphering what moves judges is notoriously difficult, apart
from the dominant influence of legal authority from legislation or
7 See, e.g., MARSHALL JEVONS, A DEADLY INDIFFERENCE (1995) (solving a fictional
murder that took place in England in the mid-1960s over valuable mining certificates);
MARSHALL JEVONS, MuRDER AT THE MARGIN (1993) (solving two fictional murders that took
place in the Virgin Islands over an old war grudge). Marshall Jevons, the combination of two
famous nineteenth-century economists, is the nom de plume of two well-regarded twentieth-
century economists, William Breit and Kenneth G. Elzinga. See id
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prior decisions.8 By and large, that influence so cabins judicial deci-
sion-making as to render any other input irrelevant.9 But there is
enough play around the edges in enough federal cases that anything
that alters judges' thinking about important legal issues can be im-
portant. The matters discussed in seminars for judges-what role
incentives play in securing the benefits of inventive activity, how
critical are property rights to liberty, does industry regulation gener-
ally help consumers or producers--certainly engage more than a few
issues that come into courts.
Professional educators commonly opine that education has
strong public good characteristics. These turn out to be remarkably
difficult to document, even in a casual way. The same is true of eco-
nomic education for judges. Neither the influence of the education on
judicial decisions nor the effects of the decisions on public welfare
are subject to ready proof.
Even so, no other venture outside the federal judiciary itself has
done so much to instruct judges as the Law & Economics Center;
none has held so many education programs for so many judges. The
many businesses and foundations that funded the Center's operation
were confident that it was improving the quality of judges' analysis of
issues with obvious economic dimensions and hopeful that the pro-
grams for judges were providing some salutary effect on judicial de-
cision-making more generally. Although it is possible that Henry was
only the consummate salesman, my own surmise is that there is at
least some truth to the assumptions that his instructions were effica-
cious.
HENRY III: MANNE THE DEAN
Henry's success with the Law & Economics Center helped the
schools at which he located, but managing a school in its entirety is a
different sort of challenge. He showed that he could do that, too.
And, like the other Henrys, Henry Manne the Dean marched to the
beat of his own drummer.
In 1985, George Mason University was looking for a dean to
dramatically upgrade its law school. The university had taken over an
unaccredited, proprietary operation that was little known outside of
the Washington, D.C. area-and not very well known inside. One of
the possible deans was Henry Manne, a possibility that both intrigued
and frightened people associated with George Mason.
8 See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-
making, 75 B.U. L REv. (1995) (examining what influences judges to make decisions and how
much of judging is determined by individual preference rather than the formal framework of the
law).
9 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RuLE OF LAW IN AMERICA (forthcoming, 2000).
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The intriguing part should be obvious, and so should the fright-
ening part. A law school is made up of several sets of folks with
quite divergent interests. The groups are joined by the hope that the
school's reputation will improve and its finances will improve, but
each group hopes that the changes will make the school conform to
their particular vision of the enterprise. A new dean brings the prom-
ise of change, but any change that clearly chooses a substantive vision
of the school-one that consists of something more than "better" or
"higher" or "richer"-surely will make constituencies that do not
share that vision unhappy. Few people with strong substantive pref-
erences get chosen to be dean, unless those preferences strongly con-
form to the dominant views of the choosers.
Henry conforms to Henry's views, and his alone. But the Presi-
dent and (enough) others at George Mason were sufficiently intent on
ratcheting up the school's reputation quickly that they were willing to
take a chance on someone who came with a strong scholarly reputa-
tion and a proven track record in attracting funding for education-
even if he had strong views. So, in 1986 Manne became Dean of the
George Mason University School of Law.
Manne served eleven years as Dean at George Mason, itself un-
usual in a land where, in any given year, one-fourth of the nation's
law schools are looking for a new dean. Not surprising, what Henry
did as dean was more unusual than the length of time for which he did
it.
Manne came to George Mason with a well-formed blueprint for
a law school. He envisioned a school at which economics and quan-
titative analysis played central roles, at which faculty members shared
a commitment to a limited set of methodologies (perhaps a single
methodology), at which scholarship was a serious requirement for
faculty members, and at which students were not given free rein to
roam across open fields of survey courses but instead were directed
along tracks that provided greater specialization and more cumulative
learning than the traditional law school education. It was a vision of
an intellectual place, in keeping with the direction law schools long
had been headed, but of a particular intellectual bent. In short, Henry
envisioned a school that looked a great deal more like Henry, and less
like most other folks, than any law school one could find.
It was not the vision of "better" or "higher"-except as those
adjectives followed from the substance of what Manne wanted. It
was not a vision that would be congenial to many of the then-current
faculty at George Mason, and indeed very few of the faculty members
who were in place when Manne arrived can be found at George Ma-
son today. But it was a genuine, substantive vision that Manne be-
lieved in and that he did implement. That was no easy feat.
210 [Vol. 50:203
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One of the lessons of "dean-ing" is the difficulty of doing what
you want. Law schools-perhaps all schools-are driven by consen-
sus. That is true to a degree in all bureaucracies, but especially so in
schools. The fact that they are non-profit enterprises, and hence lack
an ability to coalesce around a single, group maximand, is part of the
explanation. It frustrates acceptance of hierarchical decision-making
merely for its efficiency advantage. Part of the explanation is that
there is no prospect for appeal to an attractive myth, such as the social
contract-no one in a university setting can claim election by the
group for which he asserts decisional authority. A law school dean
pursuing a strong, substantive vision inevitably will have difficulty
securing consensus. And Manne was no exception to this rule. But
he forged ahead nonetheless. If lack of consensus was not a point of
pride for Manne, it also was not a paralyzing force. Manne was con-
fident that his was a good vision, and he pursued it with vigor.
Believing in free markets and in exit rights particularly, Manne
saw the option for those whose own vision of a law school differed
substantially as clear. And more than a few of those who differed
understood the wisdom of that option. Manne did, to his credit, pro-
vide carrot-incentives to faculty members who were already on board
as well as stick-incentives, offering reduced teaching loads and other
assistance to any faculty member who would return to school for a
Ph.D. in economics. At least one great success story came from that
offer. But in the main, Manne secured his vision by replacing the
faculty he inherited with a new and very different faculty, a faculty of
accomplished scholars, of rising scholars, and of people with back-
grounds in social science and promise of scholarly attainment. And
he did this with alacrity. Within seven years, half of the faculty had
changed 0 and about two-thirds of the faculty then consisted of "lat-
eral hires," a rate double that of the group of schools at the higher
ranks of the law school food chain; the group that would be thought
most likely to rely on lateral hiring.'1
The results of Manne stamping the law school in his own image
were striking. He established George Mason as a school that was un-
like any other, and he attracted far better scholars and students than
had been at the school before. Within a decade, the George Mason
faculty ranked in the top thirty in scholarship according to the criteria
used by Professors Ted Eisenberg and Martin Wells, both of Cornell,
passing such well-regarded schools as the University of North Caro-
1o See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW
TEACHERS (1986-87 - 1993-94).
1 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Ranking and Explaining the Scholarly
Impact of Law Schools, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 405 (1998) (suggesting that higher-ranked law
schools tend to make greater use of lateral hiring than other schools, but listing George Mason
and George Washington along with Cornell, Stanford, and Yale as schools with especially high
rates of lateral hiring).
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lina and the University of Washington. 12 On the student side, it saw a
significant improvement in LSAT scores-an increase of about ten
percentage points in the students' performance relative to all test-
takers13 and a rise in applications for admission from 1,101 in 1985 to
2,021 in 1996.14 Nationwide, applications rose sharply, then fell
sharply over this same period, so that the beginning and end-points
for all schools lie on a fairly fiat line.
15
At the end of the day, Manne's vision might seem a good one.
Parts of it can be seen in other schools' programs, and most of the
similarities come about after Manne's changes were implemented at
George Mason. In a free market, different visions should be intro-
duced and tested by the responses of others to them. The market has
proven Manne's vision a success, but not necessarily one that could
not stand improvement. The George Mason faculty and students of
today-those who chose the product Manne designed-would, no
doubt, left to their own devices, amend Manne's vision, and that will
occur as his successors impose their preferences on his product.
The attractiveness of Manne's vision, however, is largely beside
the point. What is especially commendable, in my view, is that
Manne's commitment to the difficult tasks associated with "dean-ing"
was a commitment to something he believed in, to a mode of educa-
tion he thought better than the alternatives. As with his other endeav-
ors, Manne was prompted to act by the prospect of making a change
toward his vision of good. Following that vision, Manne has given
the law school world a different sort of school, one that can be ac-
12 See id., at 388 (ranking George Mason thirtieth among law schools by scholarly im-
pact). Although published beyond the ten-year time line referenced above, this article-which
assessed scholarly impact as a function of the authors' citations in certain scholarly journals-is
based on citations that overwhelmingly date from prior to 1996 and almost entirely on works
published before that date.
13 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, INc., 1986 EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO
LAW SCHOOLS 136 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 EMPLOYER'S GUIDE] (indicating a LSAT mean
score of 35 in 1985); NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, INC., 1997-1998
EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO LAW SCHOOLS 129 (1997) [hereinafter 1997-1998 EMPLOYER'S GUIDE]
(indicating a LSAT median score of 159 in 1996). According to the Law School Admission
Council (LSAC), a mean score of 35 in 1985 would have been in the 71st percentile and a me-
dian score of 159 in 1996 would have been in the 80th percentile (The cited LSAC data is on
file with the Pappas Law Library, Boston University School of Law).
14 See 1986 EMPLOYER'S GUIDE, supra note 13, at 136; 1997-1998 EMPLOYER'S GUIDE,
supra note 13, at 129.
15 Data received from LSAC in a release entitled Law Services History Information,
March 1997. According to the LSAC, the estimated total number of applications submitted to
ABA approved law schools in each year from 1985 to 1996 was (rounded to the nearest 100):
1985, 254,800; 1986, 270,400; 1987, 319,700; 1988, 375,300; 1989, 414,600; 1990, 453,900;
1991, 458,300; 1992, 431,900; 1993, 422,200; 1994, 389,500; 1995, 342,000; and 1996,
308,900 (the LSAC data is on file with the Pappas Law Library, Boston University School of
Law). During this period, George Mason saw an increase of 100 percent while the general law
school world saw applications grow only by about one-fifth that proportion. See id.
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cepted or rejected by each of us, but that would not have existed in
the same way without Manne.16 Here, too, he has made a difference.
HENRY IV: MANNE THE FRIEND
Finally, I come to Henry the Friend. This is a Henry that is very
much a part of all his successes.
Henry cares deeply about individuals. Like many folks, he has
dislikes as well as likes. For those who are in the like camp, there is
little Henry would not do. Henry is a great investor in friendships.
He calls, he writes, he e-mails, he sends jokes (some good). He talks
about whatever is on his mind, or yours, anything interesting or novel
that has come his way, an article, a book, or a news story. He thinks
of things that will be good for his friends, encourages their scholar-
ship, includes them in projects, and sponsors them for memberships
in various organizations. He works at keeping connected, far better
than most of us on the other end of the e-mail.
His taste in friends is somewhat eclectic, crossing numerous
boundaries. Many scholars a generation or so behind Henry have
been the beneficiaries of his mentoring. Friends of all ages and stages
have shared his enthusiasms, willingly or not. Henry's friends all
know of his love of golf, of Memphis-pit barbecue, of art and music
and literature. These are not matters of taste; they are passions be-
cause they are right, and they should be right for all Henry's friends.
And even if you don't play golf or relish barbecue, you can't help but
join in Henry's joy at least in some measure, so his embrace of life
becomes part of the friendship.
The joy of friendship for Henry is inextricably intertwined with
his career. People he has met along the way become friends and
friends are mixed into all of Henry's professional ventures. He has
not been loved-or even liked-by everyone. But his circle of
friends is large and their mutual devotion deep.
I am fortunate to count myself within this circle. I give nothing
away to admit that friendship with Henry colors my view of all four
Henrys. This review has not been balanced-I have not attempted to
find negatives to set against the positives-and I doubt I would be
any good at it if I tried. If part of friendship is to see another's virtues
as large and faults as mere trifles, I confess that this failing cannot
help but prejudice my review. The prejudice, however, can only alter
the shading of this picture; it cannot redraw the basic contours. Even
16 Henry also was a moving force behind the creation of an organization for law school
deans that was separate from, and could serve as a counterweight to, the organizations that
accredit law schools. The American Law Deans Association, which now has as members the
deans of well over 100 of the 180 accredited American law schools, grew out of a meeting that
was hosted by Henry at George Mason. As the co-conspirator in calling that initial meeting, and
as the first president of the Association, I continue to blame Henry Manne!
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viewed uncharitably, Henry has made an enormous difference to the
law, to legal education, to several institutions, and to many lives. He
has done in full measure what all of us aspire to do. And, even now,
chapters of other Henrys may yet be written.
